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Abstract
We investigate how rising sanitary risk of agri-food products affects the geographical
concentration of European Union (EU) imports at the product level. We first estimate
a product-specific measure of sanitary risk based on the count of food alerts at EU
borders. Then we regress the evolution of geographical concentration indices on
our measure of product risk and year. We find that product sanitary risk indeed
affected the EU import pattern. Overall, the EU diversified its import sources, but
with diversification at the extensive margin and concentration at the intensive
margin. This pattern is stronger for risky products, leading to a two-tier system.
Keywords: Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed, European Union, import
concentration, Sanitary Risk Index, food safety, agricultural trade
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1. Introduction
After a series of highly publicised food scares (such as bovine spongiform en-
cephalopathy or dioxin-contaminated chickens), public-health concerns have
started to loom large in the buying policies of European Union (EU) distribu-
tors. These concerns have the potential to affect the evolution of EU foodstuff
imports and therefore the access that developing countries enjoy on EU
markets. This is the case for the poorest countries that find it most difficult
to comply with stringent sanitary standards (Maskus, Otsuki and Wilson,
2005; Garcia-Martinez, Poole and Skinner, 2006).
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The evolution of EU foodstuff import pattern over time results from a trade-
off between diversification and concentration forces. First, several elements
may drive geographical diversification. The importer’s taste for variety or a
desire to limit monopoly positions would lead to a larger number of suppliers
to import from. Also, as the access to the EU market becomes easier – de-
crease in transport costs and traditional trade barriers such as tariffs – more
countries are able to sell abroad. Alternatively, if productivity rises exogen-
ously in a pool of potential suppliers with heterogeneous productivity
levels, the number of suppliers for a given product will enlarge (Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). In practice, EU demand of agri-food products
has recently moved from tropical goods (such as coffee or cocoa) more to tem-
perate zone goods (such as fruits, vegetables and fish) which are potentially
produced by a larger number of developing countries. Second, concentration
forces arise from the oligopolistic trend in the agro-food industry (the rise of
‘supermarkets’) and its procurement system (Reardon and Timmer, 2007). In
the case of goods with a particular safety concern for the importer (Henson
and Jaffee, 2004; Jaffee et al., 2005; Czubala, Shepherd and Wilson, 2007)
the need to source from reliable producers accentuates this trend. Importantly,
the actors of this trade-off between diversification and concentration forces are
evolving over time, as new exporters progressively build up their reputation of
quality for their product and because incumbent exporters are never complete-
ly immune to food safety crisis.
This paper examines the link between the risk of food products and recent
changes in the EU import pattern. Specifically, we investigate how the sani-
tary risk of agri-food products affects the geographical concentration of EU
imports at the product level. We use a unique database that reports all agri-
food shipments that have suffered rejection at the EU border due to food
safety reasons.1 The incidence of food alerts is fairly heterogeneous across
exporting countries and might reflect exporters’ past performance or hidden
protectionism against them. Regressing concentration indices on a raw
count of alerts at the product level would say nothing without controlling
for other factors. Thus, we rely on a two-step procedure where we first esti-
mate a product-specific sanitary risk, based on food alerts controlling for con-
founding factors; then we regress, in a second step, the evolution of
geographical concentration on our measure of product risk.
We find evidence that product sanitary risk has indeed affected the EU
import pattern. Overall, there is a slight diversification of import sources
over time. This overall trend hides diversification at the extensive margin
and concentration at the intensive margin, the more so for risky products.
On the one hand, most of EU agri-food imports come from a few sources.
On the other hand, additional new countries enter the EU market. Yet, they
enter on a smaller scale than before. As a result, EU foodstuff imports gradually
1 Baylis et al. (2010) rely on the RASFF database to analyse the trade diversion and deflection
effects of EU food import refusals in the case of fishery products.
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evolve towards a two-tier distribution with a small number of dominant sup-
pliers and a growing fringe of marginal ones.
Our work relates to two distinct lines of research. First, this paper contri-
butes to the literature on trade patterns along the development process. Fol-
lowing the seminal work of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) on production and
employment, most papers have considered diversification at the product
level. Klinger and Lederman (2004), and Cadot, Carre`re and Strauss-Kahn
(2011) document a similar hump-shaped pattern for export diversification.
As to geographical diversification, micro-studies suggest a role for proximity
and experience gained in the destination markets. A country starts exporting to
one market and gradually expands to the neighbouring countries (Evenett and
Venables, 2002). This stylised fact finds further support in Eaton et al. (2008),
a detailed study of Colombian exports.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) standards as potential barriers to trade. Initially, SPS standards are not
meant to discriminate against imported goods. However, in practice, exporters
in poor countries may be priced out of the EU market. Complying with stan-
dards is costly, not only because of fixed costs of implementation at the outset
but also due to recurring costs associated with sustained traceability, certifica-
tion or quality inspection. In addition, EU standards – often more specific and
restrictive than multilateral Codex ones – are suspected of going beyond the
requirements dictated by mere sanitary concerns. An important set of research
has focused on the quantitative assessment of the trade effects of standards es-
sentially by sticking standards as explanatory variables in gravity equations
(Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, 2001; Moenius, 2006). Results are mixed.
Some country-specific standards tend to reduce trade, others promote it
(Fontagne´, Mimouni and Pasteels, 2005). Crucially, the impact of importing
country standards is negatively correlated with the level of income of the
exporting country (Disdier, Fontagne´ and Mimouni, 2008). Another set of
works, largely based on detailed case studies, provides further nuance.
Gravity model findings tend to represent short-run, average effects and do
not account for the medium-term catalysing role product standards may
play in the promotion of quality upgrading in developing countries (Diaz
Rios and Jaffee, 2008).
We differentiate ourselves from the existing literature in three important
ways. First, we adopt an ex post approach and consider effective product sani-
tary risk based on food alerts at the EU borders. Our ex post approach comple-
ments the previously cited studies that, in contrast, rely on what could be
considered de jure measures of sanitary risk. Second, contrary to previous
papers, we take the view point of the importer (EU-12) and not the exporter.
Finally, we shift focus from gravity modelling to an analysis of the geograph-
ical concentration of EU agri-food imports based on Theil’s entropy index.
The index separability property enables us to decompose the overall geo-
graphical concentration into variations at the extensive and intensive margins.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the
data, in particular the EU ‘food alerts’ database. Section 3 details our
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empirical strategy, including the two-step methodology developed for our
analysis. Section 4 reports the main empirical results, while Section 5
concludes.
2. Data
2.1. The food alerts data
We use EUROSTAT’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) for
EU12 countries.2 The RASFF is a system of notification and information ex-
change on emergency sanitary measures taken at the border by EU member
states, in place since 1979.3 The database records all notifications (19,000)
between 2001 and 2008 with the identity of the reporting importing EU
member state, exporting country, product, hazard, type of notification and
type of measure.
There are two limitations to the data. The first is a selection bias issue.
Indeed, only products exported to the EU and for which SPS regulations are
in place in the EU may be inspected and thus rejected. The second is that
alerts do not result from a random sampling of imports. On the contrary,
they reflect the concern of food hygiene control services with respect to
certain growers or shippers. Despite these caveats, the RASFF database pro-
vides reliable and best available information on the effective problems
related to food imports safety.
The database contains complete information regarding products, though in
verbal form.We painstakingly coded all products into CN8 categories over the
period 2001–2005 (8,895 observations) and matched them with trade data.4
The number of notifications sharply rose from 500 in 2001 to 2,000 in
2005, although somewhat decelerating after 2003. EU member states are het-
erogeneous in terms of the frequency of notifications (Figure 1, panel a).
Germany, Italy and Spain are the top notifying countries, with Ireland at the
other end. This may reflect differing agri-food import structures or controls
procedures among EU member states. In the following econometric analysis,
we aggregate notifications across all EU members and years to smooth out
these variations. There is also considerable heterogeneity among products
(panel b). Fruit and nuts, fish and coffee rank highest in terms of reported noti-
fications. In terms of hazards, contamination by mycotoxins (mainly aflatoxin)
is the main cause of notifications for agricultural products and affects mostly
dried fruits and nuts (panel c). The second cause is contamination by residues
2 France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Ireland, United Kingdom,
Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain. We use this restrictive definition for consistency of
time series, as EUROSTAT does not provide data on Member States before their accession.
3 The data set does not include information on intra-EU trade, which is subject to mutual recogni-
tion of norms. The safety of intra-EU food trade is supervised by the Standing Committee on the
Food Chain and Animal Health or, in case of emergency, the Commission itself. Alerts specific to
animal products traded within the EU are reported in the TRACES (TRAde Control and Expert
System) database.
4 For a more complete description of the data set, see Jaud (2011).
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of veterinary medicinal products, typically on sensitive products such as fish
and shrimps. Pathogenic micro-organisms concern especially cereals, and
pesticide residues affect fruit and vegetables. In terms of the action taken
after notification, over 85 per cent of notified shipments are stopped at the
border and are re-dispatched to extra-EU destinations, destroyed or banned
(panel d).
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of exporters’ total number of notifications
between 2001 and 2005 against their level of development in 2001, both
taken in logs. The size of the circles and diamonds is proportional to the coun-
try’s share in EU food imports in 2005. China, Turkey and Brazil are most
affected by SPS notifications, but they are also among EU’s largest suppliers.
Countries like Canada, Norway, New Zealand or the USA are large exporters
but subject to relatively few notifications.
At the other end of the spectrum, Iran and Vietnam suffer a disproportionate
number of notifications given their relatively lower import shares. This disper-
sion suggests that important country-specific characteristics, on top of sales
volumes, affect the probability of getting a notification. These characteristics
include obviously the product composition of exports, as well as unobserved
characteristics of national production systems.
Fig. 1. The food alert database, 2001–2005. (a) Notification by importing country. (b)
Notifications per CN2 sector. (c) Notifications per hazard category. (d) Actions taken
after notification.
Note: All statistics are computed as average over the period 2001–2005.
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2.2. European agri-food imports
We use EUROSTAT agri-food import data for EU-12 from 147 exporting
countries, including 122 developing countries, between 1988 and 2005, at
the CN8 level. Agri-food products, excluding beverages and animal feed,
are in chapters 1–21 of the CN system, which represent 3,073 potential
export lines. We account for reclassifications due to CN harmonisations in
1988, 1996 and 2002 and build a consistent database using the initial
nomenclature.
EU agri-food imports has evolved between 1988 and 2005. The share of
developing countries, already dominant at 66 per cent in 1988, grew even
more, reaching 70 per cent in 2001 and 75 per cent in 2005. Interestingly,
this rise is not attributable to traditional tropical products (such as coffee,
cocoa and sugar) which, as a share of imports from developing countries,
shrank from 23.9 to 15.4 per cent over the sample period. Rather, it is due
to fruit, vegetables and fisheries products, whose share in EU agri-food
imports from developing countries rose from 21.6 to 29.6 per cent. This is a
noticeable evolution as fisheries and horticulture products are highly sensitive
to SPS issues.
Interestingly, the EU sources its agri-food products from a small number of
partners; on average, 12 per cent of transactions over 1988–2005 come from a
single supplier country – there may be several supplying firms per exporting
country. This high degree of market concentration may be partially driven by
the presence of bilateral tariff quotas.
Concentration varies across sectors. Dairy products and meat are extremely
concentrated with, respectively, 39 and 35 per cent of transactions involving a
unique partner. Oppositely, the vegetable plaiting material or coffee and tea
sectors exhibit no single-partner transactions. The milling industry and the
agro-food industry preparing fats or food based on meat, fish or vegetables
Fig. 2. Main exporters concerned by SPS notifications.
Note: Simple averages at the product (CN8) level.
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stand in between, with a share of single-supplier transactions between 11 and
20 per cent, while fruit and vegetables, cocoa and fishery sectors have a single-
supplier share below 10 per cent.
3. Empirical strategy
We now investigate how the sanitary risk of agri-food products affect the
geographical concentration of EU imports at the product level.
3.1. Concentration indices
We use the Theil entropy index (Theil, 1972) as an indicator of concentration
because it is decomposable and adequate in capturing the action at both ends
of the distribution.5
Omitting the time indices, for good k, the Theil index is given by
Tk = 1
nk
∑nk
c=1
xck
mk
ln
xck
mk
( )
, (1)
where mk = 1/nk
∑nk
c=1 x
c
k is the average value of import for good k from
origin country c and nk is the total number of countries exporting good k.
The Theil index depends on the definition of nk, the number of ‘potential
exporters’, defined as the set of all countries having exported good k to
some destination in the world (not necessarily EU countries) at least two
years in a row over the sample period. We impose the requirement of two con-
secutive years of exports in order to ensure that the exporter is a successful
one. Indeed, Besedes and Prusa (2006) show that two years is the median dur-
ation of export spells. This definition of potential exporters has the advantage
of being time-invariant.6
3.2. Intensive versus extensive margins
We use the additive decomposability property of the Theil index to get a first
cut at the respective roles of the geographical intensive and extensive margins
in the overall concentration trends. In each year, we decompose our sample of
EU suppliers into two groups. Group 1, G1, is composed of active suppliers,
numbering n1kt = nEUkt , and group 0, G0, is made of potential but inactive ones,
numbering n0kt = nk − nEUkt . The Theil indices in each group are T0kt,T1kt.
5 We have also used alternative concentration indices, Gini, Herfindahl and the largest import
share, that put emphasis on different segments of the distribution, to test for the robustness
of our results. Results were similar and are available upon request.
6 Regression results are robust to alternative definitions of the number of potential exporters
(results not reported here).
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The between-group component of Theil index is given by
TBkt =
∑
j=0,1
n
j
kt
nk
mjkt
mkt
ln
mjkt
mkt
( )
.
It is a weighted average of terms involving only group means (relative to the
population mean). After a little algebra, it follows that:
TBkt = ln
nk
nEUkt
( )
. (2)
As nk is time invariant,
DTBkt = TBkt − TBkt−1 = −D ln nEUkt . (3)
That is, changes in the between-group components of Theil index trace exactly
the percentage changes in the extensive margin defined as the number of
active suppliers.
The within-group Theil index is defined as
TWkt =
∑
j=0,1
n
j
kt
nk
mjkt
mkt
T
j
kt.
As Theil index is zero when all countries have equal shares, T0kt = 0. As for
group 1,
T1kt =
1
n1kt
∑
c[G1
xckt
m1kt
ln
xckt
m1kt
( )
.
And TWkt reduces to
TWkt =
nEUkt
nkt
mEUkt
mkt
T1kt, (4)
where mEUkt = m1kt. That is, the within component of Theil index is equal to its
group-1 sub-index (concentration among active suppliers). Hence, given our
partition of suppliers, the between-group and within-group components of
Theil index map directly into the extensive and intensive margins.
3.3. Product sanitary risk and concentration
In order to examine the impact of sanitary risk on EU agro-food imports
pattern, we rely on a two-step procedure where we estimate first a measure
of sanitary risk based on food alerts.
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3.3.1. Step 1
For a product k and an exporter c, the dependent variable is the combined
count of notifications from all 12 EU member states between 2001 and
2005. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the product dummy, dk,
in the following cross-section regression:
Alertck = f (a Imp shareEUck + bControlsk + dc + dk + 1ck), (5)
where 1ck is an error term.
7 Because the number of notifications is a count,
with over-dispersion and a large proportion of zeros, estimation is made
with a negative binomial. We include exporter c share in EU imports of
product k in 2000 (one year before the sample start) (Imp shareEUck ). Indeed,
a product imported overwhelmingly from a country with weak quality stan-
dards would appear as risky, even though other exporters might have
managed to make the product safe. In addition, the incidence of alerts is
likely to be correlated with the frequency of inspections which might be cor-
related to protectionism. Hence, we include the ad valorem equivalent of the
EU’s MFN tariff on product k in 2005 (tariffk) and dummy variables indicat-
ing whether product k is affected by a quota during the sample period (quotak),
whether product k has been the object of a dispute at the WTO involving the
EU and any other country (disputek) and whether exporter c has been affected
by a ban on product k during the sample period (banck).8 Indeed, a ban could
result in less notifications just because there will be no flow at all. We also
control for the initial value of EU imports of product k in 2000, as products
imported in large volumes are likely to be inspected, and therefore fail inspec-
tions, more often than others.9
The regression also includes product and exporter fixed effects. The latter
controls for all supplier’s characteristics that may affect the quality of the
product, such as the overall level of economic development. As a conse-
quence, the coefficient of the product dummy captures the part of food
alerts that is due to the product itself, net of exporters’ characteristics and
of other factors that may affect the probability of rejection. It is what we
label the estimated product Sanitary Risk Index (SRI).10
7 All observations are pooled in the step-1 regression. Pooling attenuates the heterogeneity in the
number of notifications across importers. But this choice entails some drawbacks: it rules out the
possibility to control for supplier-product fixed effects; it might also exacerbate the potential
multi-collinearity between protection measures and the estimated sanitary risk index.
8 The tariff is the applied ad valorem tariff, including specific duties, preferential agreements and
excluding quotas, computed on TARIC, provided by J. Gallezot (2003).
9 We rely on STATA ‘exposure’ option for count models. This command is equivalent to including
the initial volume of imports as a regressor with a coefficient constrained to be equal to 1.
10 When estimated coefficients were not significant at the 10 per cent level, they were set equal to 0.
This is the case for 39 per cent of the HS-8 product lines. We also normalise the coefficients so as
to obtain non-negative values.
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3.3.2. Step 2
Estimated SRI, dˆk, are used as explanatory variables in a panel regression of
concentration indices:
Ckt = a+ bControlsk + gdˆk + hdˆk ∗ dt + dt + ds + ykt, (6)
where Ckt is a measure of concentration (overall Theil index, its within- and
between-group components or the number of active suppliers) for good k in
year t. Control variables are the same as in the first step. Time effects enter
the equation both linearly and interacted with the SRI, so as to see whether
concentration has evolved differently for risky products. Sector-specific
fixed effects (at the CN-4 level) control for time-invariant characteristics
such as supply chains and vertical integration.
In the second step, the dependent variable is defined at the product level,
with no reference to the specificity of the exporter, which was dealt with in
the previous step. If one exporter was consistently ‘bad’, that would be
indeed taken into account in step 1. However, if all the ‘bad’ exporters
were exporting exactly the same products, spurious correlation could occur,
which would result in over-estimating the impact of risk on concentration.
This case is though most unlikely at the very detailed CN-8 level.11
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Figure 3 replaces the sample period in a broader perspective and shows the
evolution of the geographical concentration indices between 1988 and 2005.
The overall Theil index shows a downward trend: geographical diversification
has occurred over time. It is paralleled by a similar downward trend of the
between-component of the Theil index, along with a rising number of sup-
pliers suggesting diversification at the extensive margin. However, the
within-group component of the Theil index shows an upward trend, indicating
a rising concentration among active EU’s suppliers. These trends are accentu-
ated after 2000.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in our ana-
lysis. The average number of potential suppliers is high (78), in contrast with
the average number of actual suppliers (12). Concentration indices are very
high, and this is consistent with our earlier observation that the distribution
of the number of active suppliers is highly skewed. It could also be partly
due to the very detailed level of disaggregation. The last line of Table 1 pre-
sents the estimated SRI, resulting from step-1 regression. It ranges between
0 and 12.2, with a mean at 0.76.
Table 2 provides a list of the sectors associated with the highest sanitary
risk. It stresses the relevance of our first-step regression. Sectors estimated
11 As the product dummies used in the second-step regression are generated regressors, standard
errors are computed with a bootstrap.
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with the highest sanitary risk are not necessarily those with the highest number
of alerts.12 The case of edible fruit and nuts is a striking example. Most of the
3,210 alerts in this sector are attributable to aflatoxin-contaminated Iranian
pistachios. After controlling for the latter, the sector ranks only sixth in
terms of sanitary risk, while fishery products and spices emerge as the riskiest.
Out of a total of 2,146 CN8 products, first-step regression results yielded
373 estimated product coefficients. No product chapter stands out as having
Fig. 3. Evolution of geographical concentration, 1988–2005.
Note: All statistics are computed as simple averages at the product (CN8) level.
Table 1. Summary statistics, 2001–2005
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Theil overall, Tkt 8,598 3.30 0.71 0.66 4.99
Theil within, TWkt 8,608 0.96 0.67 0 3.27
Theil between,TBkt 8,608 2.34 1.06 21.39 4.99
Number of active suppliers, nEUkt 8,608 12.01 12.52 1 96.00
Number of potential suppliers, nk 8,608 78.56 30.09 10.00 147.00
Sanitary Risk Index, SRIk 8,608 0.76 1.99 0 12.21
12 The correlation between the SRI and the average number of alerts between 2001 and 2005 is
equal to 0.32.
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particularly high risk levels, except for fisheries products, with mussels as an
unsurprising outlier (Figure 4). Remarkably, traditional tropical products such
as coffee and cocoa, whose share in EU foodstuff imports is declining, are
among the safest products.
Our ex post approach, based on effective food alerts, complements previous
studies that consider the effect of the existence of public legal standards
(without indication on how they are actually implemented). A widely used
measure of the latter is the number of notifications of SPS measures made
to the WTO. The correlation between the number of public SPS notifications
to the WTO (provided in Disdier, Fontagne´ and Mimouni, 2008) and the SRI
is low, at 20.05. This may partly be explained by the fact that the number of
notifications is computed at the HS6 level, while our measure of risk is at the
HS8 level. In addition, many products have at least one notification, while few
products have a positive SRI, once controlled for exporting country’s charac-
teristic and the endogeneity of inspections.
Table 2. SRI at the CN2 level
Sector
Number
of risky
products SRIa
Number
of alerts
2001–
2005
Most frequent
cause for
rejection
Coffee, tea, mate, spices 38 2.07 934 Composition,
mycotoxins
Preparations of meat and fish 32 1.29 309 Veterinary drugs residues
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 25 1.04 1,491 Mycotoxins
Fish, crustaceans and molluscs 108 0.95 2,641 Veterinary drugs residues
Miscellaneous edible preps 7 0.85 185 Food additives
Edible fruit and nuts 53 0.71 3,210 Mycotoxins
Edible vegetables 27 0.65 441 Pesticide residues
Cocoa and cocoa prep. 4 0.57 20 Allergens
Prepared vegetable, fruit, nuts 44 0.54 677 Mycotoxins
Sugar 5 0.49 221 Food additives
mycotoxins
Products of animal origin 3 0.48 40 Veterinary drugs residues
Meat and edible meat offal 17 0.24 498 Pathogens
Animal or vegetable fats 7 0.18 247 Composition
Preparations of cereals 2 0.16 167 Radiation
Dairy produce 0 0.03 367 Veterinary drugs residues
Live animals 0 0 1 Heavy metals
Live trees and other plants 0 0 0 –
Cereals 0 0 158 GMO/mycotoxins
Milling industry products 0 0 36 Food additives
Resins, gums 0 0 1 Food additives
Vegetable plaiting materials 1 0 1 Labelling incorrect
Risky products are products with a positive and significant SRI.
aAverage over all CN8 products in each CN2 sector.
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4.2. Product risk and geographical concentration
We now turn to the relationship between public-health concerns and the con-
centration of EU suppliers (Table 3). The dependent variables are, respective-
ly, the four indices of concentration shown in Figure 3. They are regressed on
the product sanitary risk and its interaction with a time trend. All regressions
are estimated using OLS and include a set of controls with time and sector
(CN4) fixed effects.13
The coefficients of the product sanitary risk are highly significant and nega-
tive: product risk has a negative impact on agro-food import concentration.
This overall trend hides two diverging evolutions: at the intensive margin,
concentration is higher for riskier products (column 2); at the extensive
margin, concentration is lower for those risky products (column 3) and the
number of suppliers is higher (column 4). That is, the higher the risk of the
product imported, the larger the share of the top suppliers – the intensive
margin – and the larger the number of suppliers of that product on the EU
market.14 Results also suggest that the presence of a quota negatively
Fig. 4. Distribution of significant point estimates on product dummies
13 We run equation (6) in cross-sections, dropping the interaction term. Results remained qualita-
tively the same and are available upon request.
14 Regressions on SRI alone give a coefficient of 0.073 for the within Theil index and of 2.019 for the
number of suppliers. Thus, a 1 per cent increase in the level of the SRI results in a 5.8 per cent
(¼0.073 × 0.76/0.96) increase in the level of concentration among active suppliers and a 12.7
per cent (¼2.019 × 0.76/12) increase in the number of suppliers to the EU.
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Table 3. Sanitary risk and EU import concentration, 2001–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Theil overall Theil within Theil between Number of active suppliers
sanitary_riskk 20.077*** (0.010) 0.025** (20.010) 20.101*** (20.013) 1.255*** (20.261)
sanitary_riskk × time 0.017 (0.012) 0.086*** (20.012) 20.0731*** (20.014) 1.358*** (20.296)
quotak 0.218*** (0.052) 20.230*** (20.057) 0.447*** (20.082) 23.151*** (20.878)
tariffk 20.0007 (0.001) 0.0002 (20.001) 20.0009 (20.001) 20.010 (20.009)
bank 0.050 (0.150) 20.025 (20.135) 0.077 (20.201) 22.216 (22.292)
disputek 21.264*** (0.236) 20.193 (20.151) 21.074*** (20.352) 2.301 (26.643)
Constant 4.421*** (0.149) 1.101*** (20.099) 3.318*** (20.222) 10.145** (24.092)
Observations 8,602 8,608 8,608 8,608
R2 0.337 0.398 0.469 0.434
OLS with sector (CN4) and time effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10 per cent level.
**Statistical significance at the 5 per cent level.
***Statistical significance at the 1 per cent level.
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affects both the dominant position of top suppliers and the number of
suppliers.15
Figure 5 confirms the rising polarisation between the bottom and the top of
the distribution of exporters for risky products. Panels (a) and (b) show the
first and last quartile import share distribution in 2005 for risky versus safe
products. Risky products are, as before, defined as products with a positive
and significant risk coefficient. For the smallest partners, the curve for risky
products shifts to the left compared with the curve for safe products, while
for the top exporters, the two curves almost overlap. A regression of equation
(6) using the import share of the top and the bottom quartile of suppliers as
alternative measures of concentration suggests that the import share of the
top quartile of suppliers increases with the SRI, while the share of the smallest
suppliers decreases with the risk of the products.16
All in all, our results provide robust evidence that the distribution of EU
suppliers is affected by the level of product sanitary risk. For the riskiest pro-
ducts, we observe few dominant suppliers with a growing fringe of small-scale
suppliers.
That said, an interesting follow-up question is whether the new entrants into
the EU are also small in world trade. To answer this question and characterise
better those small-scale suppliers, we adapt Hummels and Klenow (2005) def-
inition of the (product-wise) extensive margin to a geographical setting, which
is written as
EMk =
∑
c[Sk
Mc,Wk∑
c M
c,W
k
,
Fig. 5. Import share distribution for risky and safe products, 2005. (a) Smallest exporters,
last quartile. (b) Biggest exporters, first quartile.
15 We run equation (6) dropping all products with quotas (25 per cent of observations). Coefficients
on the product sanitary risk and the interaction term are of similar level of magnitude and signifi-
cance, suggesting that the presence of quotas is adequately controlled for in step 1 (results avail-
able upon request).
16 Results available upon request.
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with Sk being the set of EU active suppliers and c the country. The geograph-
ical extensive margin accounts for the importance of EU suppliers’ exports in
world trade: if the EU imports wheat from the USA and Australia, and rice
from Niger and the Mali, both products are sourced from two countries, but
the USA and Australia are much larger in wheat trade than are Niger and
Mali in rice trade; hence, EM will be higher for wheat than for rice. When
regressed over a year dummy, no trend is apparent. This suggests that
despite the growing number of EU partners, newcomers into EU supply
chains are so small in world trade that they make no difference in the extensive
margin. Thus, inequality is rising among EU suppliers, not because large sup-
pliers acquire increasingly dominant positions, but rather because small sup-
pliers, that are also small players in world trade, keep coming in as new
exporters to the EU.
A possible explanation for the fact that entrants begin small-scale in the
presence of risk is that they are being tested. The explanation put forward
for such a pattern is a search for ‘food safety’ from the buyer, with sellers
building up reputations (Jaud, 2010). Alternatively, exporters would want to
‘try the market’ small-scale before taking big risks (Rauch and Watson,
2003). There may be other mechanisms as well that could contribute to this
pattern. First, our results may be capturing the increasing vertical integration
of global food supply chains, along with the rise in foreign investment both in
food processing and retailing sectors and the dominance of large multinational
food companies. Second, the concentration at the intensive margin creates
larger rents that may in turn attract smaller exporters – this explanation,
however, would suppose neither barriers to entry, nor sunk costs. We leave
these questions for future research.
5. Concluding remarks
This article establishes a stylised fact on EU import concentration in agri-food
products and makes a link between this import pattern and rising public-health
concerns in the EU food policy.
While previous empirical works have focused on a de jure definition of
standards or their ex ante impact on trade flows, this article is, to our knowl-
edge, the first to assess their ex post and effective impact. Using for the first
time a data set on food alerts that provide information on the implementation
of SPS standards by EU importing countries, this article contributes to the em-
pirical debate on the evolution of geographical concentration of EU agri-food
imports across time. The empirical results are clear. EU foodstuff imports over
the period 1988–2005 have gradually evolved towards a two-tier distribution
with a small number of dominant suppliers and a growing fringe of marginal
ones. European importers tend to buy their agri-food products from an increas-
ingly large portfolio of suppliers, but orders are concentrated on a fewer
number of reliable suppliers. This evolution is more marked for products
that entail a sanitary risk according to the EU regulation.
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While not taking a normative stand, the paper offers some interesting policy
implications. From the viewpoint of developing supplier countries, as EU
foodstuff distributors show growing concerns for food safety, their export op-
portunities to EU markets are increasingly constrained, the more so, for high-
value, but sanitary risky products. From the viewpoint of the EU importer as
well, concentration of imports may be a concern, as it increases the depend-
ence on a few sources, which cannot be totally immune from sanitary risk.
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